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Abstract 
 
We review recent research in robotics and neuroscience with the aim of highlighting some points 
of agreement and convergence. Specifically, we compare BrooksÕ [9]  subsumption architecture 
for robot control with a part of the neuroscience literature that can be interpreted as demonstrating 
hierarchical control systems in animal brains. We focus first on work that follows the tradition of 
Hughlings Jackson [23]  who, in neuroscience and neuropsychology, is particularly associated 
with the notion of layered competence.  From this perspective we further argue that recent work 
on the defense system of the rat can be interpreted by analogy to BrooksÕ subsumption 
architecture. An important focus is the role of multiple learning systems in the brain, and of 
hierarchical learning mechanisms in the rat defense system. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
The field of adaptive behaviour seeks a convergence of ideas from the different disciplines that study biological and 
artificial autonomous systems. Demonstrating convergence allows the interchange of concepts and ideas and 
enriches our understanding of both the natural and the synthetic [2, 32] . This paper reviews research in robotics and 
neuroscience with the aim of highlighting some points of agreement. Specifically, we aim to show a convergence 
between BrooksÕ [9]  subsumption architecture for robot control  and a part of the neuroscience literature can be 
interpreted as demonstrating hierarchical control systems in animal brains. We focus first on work that follows the 
tradition of Hughlings Jackson [23]  who, in neuroscience and neuropsychology, is particularly associated with the 
notion of layered competence. From this perspective we then further argue that recent work on the defense system of 
the rat can be interpreted by analogy to BrooksÕ subsumption architecture. A various points through the paper we 
also consider the role of learning in modular control systems in animals and robots. 
2 BrooksÕ subsumption architecture 
Rod BrooksÕ [9-12]  work in engineering robot ÔcreaturesÕ needs little introduction to researchers in adaptive 
behaviour. In the mid-eighties Brooks introduced a new methodologyÑbased on an analogy with natural 
evolutionÑfor building Ôself-sustainingÕ mobile robots that operate in real-time and in un-customised human 
environments. This work has had enormous influence in robotics, and together with other contemporary work that 
proposed a move towards more distributed and situated systems (e.g. [7, 33] ), has inspired a new research paradigm 
in Artificial Intelligence (see e.g. [28, 32] ). One of the key contribution of BrooksÕ work is his proposal for layered, 
distributed control architecture for mobile robots, termed the subsumption architecture (SA). The SA was introduced 
in [9]  and has been subject to only limited modification since [10] . The same basic architecture has been employed 
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in the design and control of a large number of mobile robots (see [11] ) and has been widely copied. The key aspects 
of SA, of relevance here, are as follows: 
Distributed, layered control 
Control in a BrooksÕ robot is distributed across a hierarchy of ÔlayersÕ, each composed of multiple modules often 
mounted on different processors. Layers operate in parallel and asynchronously. Within a layer there is no central 
control module. 
Behavioural decomposition with a hierarchy of Ôlevels of competenceÕ 
The different layers of the control system are viewed as implementing specific behaviours [10] , the task of 
controlling the robot is thus decomposed behaviourally rather than functionally. Within a layer there may be a 
functional decomposition, for instance, into sensor and actuator components, however, different layers will use 
different decompositions based on specialised sub-sets of the available sensori-motor apparatus. Behaviours at 
ascending levels in the hierarchy implement increasingly sophisticated solutions to increasingly abstract and 
complex tasksÑwith each added layer the robot therefore attains a higher level of overall competence. Damage or 
failure at a higher level reduces the robot to functioning at the level of the next highest layer. 
Incremental construction 
A key constraint on the design process is that, as each additional level of competence is incorporated, the total 
system should be Òa strict augmentation of the previous oneÓ [10] .  
Conflict resolution and communication between levels by subsumption mechanisms 
Higher levels of the control system  ÔsubsumeÕ the roles of lower ones, principally by suppressing their outputs and 
(optionally) substituting their own. Each lower level system continues to  function as higher levels are added, 
ÔunawareÕ that the levels above may be interfering with its data paths. 
Little sensor fusion and no central models 
BrooksÕ asserts that there is rarely the need to fuse data from multiple sensors (so as to determine the most accurate 
estimate possible of world state).  Rather, he argues that conflicts between different sources of information can be 
resolved by arbitration at the motor command level. One consequence of this view is the principle that the robot 
should have no need for central world models into which all available sense data is compiled. Rather than exploiting 
shared representations, behaviours at different levels are separated by Òabstraction barriersÓ [11] , unable to share 
state or influence each others internal workings by anything more than simple subsumption mechanisms. 
Learning  
Many of BrookÕs early robots were not designed to learn autonomously. However, BrookÕs [12]  has noted the value 
of learning for such tasks as sensor/actuator calibration, modification and tuning of behaviours, handling interactions 
between behaviours, acquiring task-relevant world knowledge (e.g. building spatial maps), and the aquisition of new 
behavioural modules.  Some of these learning capacities have been investigated on BrooksÕ robots (see [12] ) but it 
is recognised that the investigation of learning in subsumption architectures is still at an early stage. One of the aims 
of this paper is to identify some of the characteristics of learning in natural systems that may suggest ways of 
incorporating learning into layered robot control systems. 
Despite the huge impact of BrooksÕ research in robotics and Artificial Intelligence, its influence on the study of 
natural autonomous systems has been more limited. Work in this wider area, that acknowledges the influence of 
BrooksÕ approach, includes studies of human perception and motor control [4, 25] , human development, and 
research in computational neuroethology [3, 15, 18] .  
That the main impact of BrooksÕ research has been in AI is perhaps unsurprising. BrooksÕ explicitly states that, 
although the SA draws on an evolutionary metaphor, it is not a biological model, he also warns of the dangers of 
treating biological intelligence as a lodestar for AI [12] . However, Brooks also insists that his interest is in general 
intelligence [12] , that he sees animal intelligence as an important Òexistence proof of the possibility of intelligent 
entitiesÓ [11] , and that we should expect to gain insights for robot design by looking at the nervous systems of 
animals [12] . The search for further links between BrooksÕ robot architectures and our understanding of animal 
intelligence therefore fits naturally with the situated robotics approach. 
3 The Jacksonian perspective in neuroscience 
In 1884, in a famous lecture on the Òevolution and dissolution of the nervous systemÓ the British neurologist John 
Hughlings Jackson [23]  proposed a hierarchical view of the nervous system, in which the brain is seen as 
implementing multiple layers of sensori-motor competence. JacksonÕs hierarchical view of the brain was based not 
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on the usual morphological divisions (spinal cord, medulla oblongata, and so on) but on functional grounds, or has 
he put it Òas to the degree of indirectness with which each [division] represents the body, or part of itÓ. He divided 
the nervous system into lower, middle, and higher centres, and proposed that this hierarchy represented a 
progression from the Ômost organisedÕ (most fixed) to the Ôleast organisedÕ (most modifiable), from the Ômost 
automaticÕ to the Ôleast automaticÕ, and from the most Ôperfectly reflexÕ to the least Ôperfectly reflexÕ.  This 
progression sees an increase in competence in a manner that we might now understand as a behavioural 
decompositionÑhigher centres are concerned with same sort of sensori-motor coordinations as those below, though 
in a more indirect and complex fashion: 
ÒThat the middle motor centres represent over again what all the lowest motor centres have represented, 
will be disputed by few. I go further, and say that the highest motor centres (frontal lobes) represent over 
again, in more complex combinations, what the middle motor centres represent. In recapitulation, there is 
increasing complexity, or greater intricacy of representation, so that ultimately the highest motor centres 
represent, or, in other words, coordinate, movements of all parts of the body in the most special and 
complex combinations.Ó  ([23]  p. 53) 
Jackson viewed the evolution of the nervous system as an incremental process in which lower levels are retained 
intact but are suppressed by higher systems. Within his hierarchy of centres Jackson further considered there to be 
functionally distinct ÔlayersÕ. He argued for a dissociation of higher layers from those below such that a breakdown 
at a higher layerÑa ÒdissolutionÓ in JacksonÕs terminologyÑcaused a reversion to the next highest layer of control. 
There are further important parallels between JacksonÕs writing and contemporary approaches in robotics, for 
instance, he was an early of advocate of the notion of distributed representation. Overall, his writings show a 
conviction that ÔhigherÕ thought is grounded in perception and actionÑa perspective which, while radical for his 
era1, is clearly in sympathy with recent proponents of Ôsituated actionÕ (e.g. [11, 14] ): 
ÒA man physically regarded is a sensori-motor mechanism. I particularly wish to insist that the highest 
centresÑphysical basis of mind or consciousnessÑhave this kind of constitution, that they represent 
innumerable different impressions and movements of all parts of the body [..] It may be rejoined that the 
highest centres are Òfor mindÓ. I assert that they are Òfor bodyÓ, too. If the doctrine of evolution be true, all 
nervous centres must be of sensori-motor constitution.Ó  ([23]  p. 63) 
A number of researchers have explicitly embraced a ÔJacksonian perspectiveÕ on the hierarchical nature of the 
nervous system, with an experimental program founded on these principles [8, 13, 20, 38, 44, 45] 2. Before 
proceeding to a detailed account of a specific system (the defense system of the rat) a range of research in support of 
this position will be briefly reviewed. 
The Jacksonian view predicts a dissociation between higher and lower level components of a system where the 
lower level competence is left intact by damage at a higher level. Examples of dissociations between cortical and 
sub-cortical systems include that between the Ôtwo visual systemsÕ in the superior colliculus and the visual cortex 
[39] , between Ôproximal cueÕ (mid-brain) and Ôdistal cueÕ (hippocampus) spatial navigation systems [34] , and 
between taste systems in the neocortex and mid-brain [8] .  
Teitelbaum et al. [45]  provide a review of evidence on dissociation between higher cortical functions and 
intermediate level Ôsub-modulesÕ that implement coordinated sets of ÔalliedÕ reflexes. Like ourselves, they argue that 
an understanding of these systems could be useful in robot design. 
 A further implication of a Jacksonian view is that during ontogeny (development) the brain matures through the 
addition of higher centres [45] . This developmental sequence has been observed post-natally, in the maturation of 
rats and rhesus monkeys (see below). A related phenomenon is the Ôwarm-upÕ sequence observed in the recovery of 
locomotory behaviours of brain-damaged adult rats [19]  and of infant rats placed in an open field [17]  where 
different types of movement are recruited in a characteristic order. This sequential addition of competences can be 
interpreted as the successive involvement of higher level brain centres [17] . 
                                                            
1The prevailing view was that the brain-stem and spinal cord controlled motor functions whilst 
the cerebral cortex was reserved for higher cognitive functions [22, 23] . 
2The influence of Hughlings Jackson is also acknowledged by Arbib who has given Jacksonian 
analysis of a model of optic flow processing [1] . 
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Multiple learning systems  
Razran [36]  (see also [21] ) reviewed a wide range of literature in comparative psychology and argued for four 
ÒsuperlevelsÓ of learning appearing at different evolutionary stages. At the lowest level of his Ôlearning hierarchyÕ 
were the ÔreactiveÕ learning mechanisms capable of habituation and sensitization that exist in all animals. A second 
level of ÔassociativeÕ learning systems, present in vertebrates and some inverbrates, allowed most forms of classical 
(stimulus-reward) and instrumental (stimulus-response) conditioning, while a third level of ÔintegrativeÕ learning, 
present only in higher vetebrates, allowed the ability to acquire responses to compound stimuli and to learn the 
relationships between stimuli. A final level of ÔsymbolicÕ learning  was restricited to humans  and was primarily 
concerned with language acquisition. Razran proposed that in phylogenetically later animals multiple levels coexist 
with the higher levels dominating lower ones.  
The distinction between ÔassociativeÕ and ÔintegrativeÕ learning systems, appearing under a number of different 
labels and guises, has gained considerable attention in research in psychology and neuroscience. Patterns of learning 
impairment in human amnesiacs  and lesion studies with animals (see [21, 41]  for review) indicate that ÔintegrativeÕ 
learning abilities rely on specific cortical structures in the brain, in particular, the hippocampus. In contrast the 
simpler associative forms of learning are supported by neural systems that evolved much earlier. Dissociations 
between multiple learning systems have recently been demonstrated by McDonald and White [30]  who investigated 
parallel learning systems in the hippocampus, amygdala, and basal ganglia. Lesions to any two of these three 
learning systems in the rat left intact the learning capability of the third. 
The development sequence in the acquistition of higher brain centres, noted above, is also clearly demonstrated in 
the maturation of learning systems.  For instance, in rats, reflexive responses to stimuli (visual, auditory, or 
gustatory) have been shown to mature several days before the same stimuli are able mediate learned behavioural 
reactions [38] . Unlearned reflexive responses can be generated by the brain-stem components whereas associative 
learning requires higher level brain centres, this evidence is therefore consistent with a Jacksonian progression. 
Evidence that this developmental sequence extends to cortical systems comes from spatial learning, where it has 
been demonstrated that the ratÕs ability to use proximal cues (probably involving the striatal learning system) is prior 
to spatial learning with respect to multiple distal cues (involving the hippocampal learning system) [38] . 
As is demonstrated further below, learning in higher level systems often involves the coordination, potentiation or 
suppression of outputs at the next lowest layer, thus learning in higher level systems is concerned with modulating 
coordinated responses of increasing sophistication and complexity. 
5 Subsumption in the rat defense system 
BrooksÕ SA provides a candidate architecture for distributed and hierarchical robot control inspired by evolutionary 
principles; Jacksonian neuroscience shows empirical evidence for layers of competence in animal brains. It is our 
view that, if the parallels between the two disciplines can be clearly drawn, neuroscience should be able to suggest 
improvements for layered robot control architectures. In addition, SA could help to further our understanding of the 
architecture of biological nervous systems. In this section of the paper we are therefore concerned to look for a such 
a parallel, specifically, we review empirical findings concerning the defense system of the rat and argue that this 
shows remarkable architectural similarities to BrooksÕ SA. Although the lowest levels of the defense system are 
reflexive, it will be shown that learning plays an increasingly important role at higher levels. 
A substantial body of research into the neural defense mechanisms of the rat can be interpreted as showing a 
hierarchically organised set of functional modulesÑhigher level components provide increasingly sophisticated 
solutions to the problems of reducing and avoiding harm. Each level in this architecture has its own sensory inputs 
and connections to motor/autonomic outputs, and when activated by appropriate stimuli, each level is capable of 
delivering a set of appropriate adaptive reactions.  The output of all levels appears to be relayed to a restricted set of 
motor, autonomic, and hormonal effector units, which delivers a relatively stereotyped Òdefense reactionÓ [49] . The 
basic architecture is illustrated in the following figure: 
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Figure:  Hierarchical organisation of neural mechanisms of defense: higher level components provide increasingly 
sophisticated solutions to problems of reducing and avoiding harm. 
The following reviews the structures at each level in the hierarchy beginning with the lowest. 
Level  0Ñlow level avoidance of actual harm 
The bottom level of the hierarchy is characterised by simple reactions to intense, harmful or potentially harmful, 
contact stimuli. Reactions of this type are seen in both invertebrates and vertebrates. In mammals such mechanisms 
are typically simple withdrawal reflexes motivated by noxious stimuli. Touching something hot initiates a di-
synaptic withdrawal reflex mediated at the level of the spinal cord [40].  Similarly, a puff of air directed at the eye 
elicits an eye-blink [50] .  Both reactions are examples of reflexes which involve relatively few muscle groups and 
protect the organism from actual harm. In evolutionary terms they are mediated by the oldest parts of the nervous 
system, namely, the brainstem and spinal cord. 
Level  1Ñintermediate level systems organise co-ordinated responses to harm 
Intermediate level systems, represented principally in the midbrain, add sophistication to both sensory and motor 
aspects of defensive behaviour.   
First, systems have developed to detect stimuli which, themselves are not harmful, but give warning of harm; vision, 
of course, is the best example.  Experiments, reviewed by the Blanchards [6]  show that midbrain visual systems are 
critical for the Ôdistance-defenseÕ sub-system observed in rats.  It is likely that a set of filters in the rat (midbrain) 
superior colliculus monitors the distance of a potential threat. Each filter would be tuned to threats at a particular 
distance range and separately wired to motor systems delivering appropriate responses: ÒfreezeÓ is the characteristic 
response at long-range, ÒflightÓ at intermediate distances, and ÒattackÓ at short range.  
Second, compared with simple withdrawal, escape and avoidance often involves the vigorous use of many muscles.  
This requires the development of: (a) systems that can co-ordinate the complicated movements involved in ÒflightÓ 
and ÒfightÓ; and (b) autonomic and endocrine systems that can sustain the increased energy requirements of 
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vigorous activity.  The midbrain periaqueductal grey (PAG) is generally viewed as the principle intermediate level 
structure responsible for co-ordinating the wide range of somatomotor, autonomic, and endocrine reactions involved 
in defensive behaviour [5] .  For example, it appears that the outputs of nociceptors (pain receptors) located deep 
within the body selectively activate regions of the PAG associated with behavioural suppression and quiescence, 
while nociceptors from the body surface activate parts of the PAG producing active avoidance and escape [24] .   
It is particularly interesting to note that these intermediate level systems evolved in creatures like fish, frogs and 
lizards but anatomical and physiological evidence suggests that many have been retained in mammals including 
humans. In addition to the mid-brain components noted above, the (fore-brain) basal ganglia are also implicated in 
the control of intermediate level defense reactions.  It is known that the basal ganglia are among the oldest regions of 
the forebrain and are present, with the same basic connections and cell types, in all jawed vertebrates including fish 
[31] . 
Level 2Ñhigh level systems learn that arbitrary stimuli can be predictive of harm. 
At higher levels of the defense hierarchy arbitrary events can be associated with harm and used as triggers for the 
full suite of defense reactions.  Thus a neutral light (conditioned stimulus) can be associated with a harmful 
footshock (unconditioned stimulus).  After several pairings, defensive reactions, previously elicited by footshock, 
are evoked when light is presented alone. This is termed a conditioned emotional response  [26] .  The limbic 
system, and the amygdala in particular, appear to play the key role in the acquisition of these associations. To 
perform this task the amygdala has the following critical features: 
¥ It receives sensory information, from both low-level and high-level sensory structures, encoding (conditioned) 
stimuli that can be simple or complex and of any modality (visual, auditory, tactile, or olfactory). On a further 
channel (probably via the Parabrachial nucleus) it receives primitive signals associated with pain and distress 
(unconditioned stimuli). 
¥ It has connections to output mechanisms at lower levels of the hierarchy (hypothalamus, midbrain, pons and 
medulla) through which the various behavioural, autonomic and endocrine reactions to defend the animal are 
expressed.  
¥ Sensory stimuli coding situational variables (e.g. presence of a light) that arrive in the amygdala at the same 
time as signals signifying pain (footshock) rapidly acquire the ability to activate defense-related output channels 
(by simple classical conditioning). 
This analysis suggests the amygdala operates by putting an Ôemotional stampÕ on any sensory input which is present 
at the same time or occurs just before something nasty. In other words, if that stimulus occurs again in the future, it 
is given access to the defence circuitry.  
The ability to acquire such responses in the case of relatively primitive, uni-modal stimuli, appears to be dissociated 
from the highest cortical centres. For example, LeDoux (1992) has found that relatively primitive subcortical 
auditory structures provide the input for the conditioned emotional response to a simple tone. Similarly, Davis 
(1992) established that subcortical (thalamic) visual input was required for a light induced emotionally-modulated 
defense reflex. In both cases lesions of the higher level visual and auditory cortex failed to abolish the respective 
responses.  More complex sensory events require more sophisticated sensory analyses performed by sensory 
neocortex and sensory association areas, these structures consequently have direct output projections to the 
amygdala. The hippocampal learning system also projects to the amygdala (via the subiculum), providing access to 
additional contextual knowledge that may allow the animal to distinguish between threatening and non-threatening 
situations. 
Level 4Ñcortical systems may unlearn associations between arbitrary stimuli and harm 
Such are the vagaries of life that an acquired association between a stimulus and harm can later cease to be 
appropriate.  LeDoux [27]  has recently suggested that a yet higher level of competence is required to un-learn such 
associations between arbitrary stimuli and harm. This proposal arose from experiments on the conditioned emotional 
response that began by pairing a tone with an electric shock. After relatively few trials defense reactions to the tone 
were well established, at which point the shock was turned off so that the tone no longer predicted the aversive 
stimulus.  Very gradually, over several weeks, the conditioned emotional reactions to the tone subsided and 
eventually disappeared. Once extinction had occurred restricted lesions were placed in the frontal cortex. On the first 
trial following these lesions the conditioned emotional response to the tone (alone) re-emerged at full strength.  
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This remarkable result suggests that acquired associations between conditioned and unconditioned stimuli at the 
level of the amygdala remained intact throughout the extinction period.  In other words, the extinction of the 
emotional response did not reflect a gradual weakening of the link between the tone input and defense output within 
the amygdala. Instead, it appears that the frontal cortex gradually learned that the tone was no longer dangerous and 
established an appropriate inhibitory connection to the amygdala. This connection suppressed the output (in 
response to the tone) from the amygdala to efferent defense areas.  When the frontal cortex was lesioned, the 
modulating inhibitory input to the amygdala was lost releasing the emotional link between the tone and defense 
reactions. These findings may have important implications for devising rational strategies for dealing with clinical 
problems such as phobias and post-traumatic stress disorders.  However, for the present purposes it suffices to say 
that the frontal cortex may represent an even higher level module in the hierarchy of systems determining defense 
behaviour. 
6 Is the rat defense system a subsumption architecture? 
The above paints a fascinating picture of the defense system in the rat brain. The similarities to a subsumption 
architecture are clear and can be summarised as follows: 
Distributed control 
The defense system is composed of multiple sub-systems operating in parallel.  Each level makes an important 
contribution to the functionality of the whole system.  
Behavioural decomposition with a hierarchy of competences 
At ascending levels the system implements defense reactions of increasing complexity and sophistication. Lower 
level defense reactions do not depend on higher level structures and will operate when triggered unless actively 
inhibited by higher levels. There is a dissociation between levels such that damage to higher level structures leaves 
lower level behaviours unimpaired. 
Conflict resolution and communication between levels by subsumption mechanisms 
Anatomical studies [37, 43, 46]  indicate that outputs from higher level modules such as the amygdala and cerebral 
cortex converge on lower somatomotor, autonomic and endocrine output units.  Thus higher level systems act by 
modulating the outputs generated at lower layers.  In the defense hierarchy we see several examples of subsumption-
like mechanisms that implement this modulation. 
First, higher-level systems can coordinate multiple lower level mechanisms. This is observed in the coordinated 
control, by mid-brain defense sub-systems, of sets of lower-level reflex mechanisms.  
Second, higher-level systems can provide substitute inputs to lower-level output mechanisms in the absence of 
primary noxious sensory information impinging on the lower layer. This is evident in the conditioned emotional 
response where low-level defense reactions can be triggered by arbitrary and potentially complex configurations of 
non-noxious sensory stimuli.  A further example, is the task of orienting to the position of a remembered, and 
previously dangerous, target. In such situations, high level systems clearly must impose control without low-level 
sensory input. Thus, the low-level gaze positioning system (the superior colliculus) operates regardless of whether 
its input denotes a real or a remembered object [48] .   
Third, higher level systems can inhibit those below. This is essential if you are to avoid assaulting the dentist while 
he/she is drilling your teeth! A more formal example, described above, is the continuous inhibitory signal3 from the 
frontal cortex to the amygdala that allows unlearning of the conditioned emotional response.   
Finally, lower level reactions can be modulated by simple mechanisms such as gain control. An example of this is 
the potentiated startle response [16]  in which the amplitude of a low level reflex behaviour is dramatically enhanced 
when the animal is in a ÔfearfulÕ state initiated by a higher level module. This potentiation of the startle response is 
caused by an output from the amygdala that taps into the lower level reflex arc. 
If high-level systems were able to get inside and really Ôfiddle aroundÕ with the internal workings of lower ones (i.e. 
by using more than simple subsumption-like mechanisms to modulate the lower-level activity) then this would 
weaken the position of SA as an analogy for neural architecture.  This appears not to be the case with the rat defense 
system, although it may be true elsewhere in the rat brain. 
                                                            
3It is interesting to note that this exact form of subsumption control (continuous, active 
inhibition) was a refinement that was added to the original SA (Brooks 89) to replace inhibitory 
mechanisms based on time-outs.  
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Little sensor fusion and no central models 
At lower and intermediate levels, sensory inputs are largely unfused and subject to basic processing, however, this is 
generally not the case in higher level brain systems [42] . For instance, recent evidence suggests that solutions to the 
spatial correspondence between visual and auditory maps are computed at cortical levels and used to enhance the 
representation, at lower levels, of near threshold, weak visual and auditory stimuli  Thus, if two sources correspond 
in place, signal-enhancement can be observed in intermediate level somatomotor output mechanisms [47] . If the 
branch twitches and the leaves rustle at the same location, then a defense reaction will be much more likely. 
The dissociation between layers of the defense system demonstrates that lower-level mechanisms are not dependent 
on any unified representations that might be established at higher levels. In general, each level has its own sensor 
channels and sensor processing mechanisms, thus BrooksÕ notion of Òabstraction barriersÓ is at least partially 
respected. 
Learning 
The principle learning system in the defense system is the amygdala. Its key role is to allow abitrary stimuli access 
to the largely Ôhard-wiredÕ coordinated sets of defense reactions. The primary channels for inputs to this system are 
from mid-brain sensory areas, however, additional sensory-processing and learning systems in the cortex and 
hippocampus, sit above the amygdala and provide it with more sophisticated sensory and contextual inputs. One 
notable characteristic of this system is that extinction appears not to involve the eradication of a learned response but 
active inhibition of that response by a higher level system. The knowledge acquired through learning is perhaps too 
valuable for it to be easily erased. 
In summary, the above correspondences would appear sufficient to justify our view that the architecture of the 
defense system is closely analogous to BrooksÕ SA. 
7 A hypothetical robotic model 
We conclude by describing a SA for a hypothetical autonomous robot designed to mirror the structure of the defense 
system of the rat. 
At level 0, we have a brain-stem/spinal-cord sub-system that produces a rapid reflex reaction to painful, contact 
stimuli. For the robot an analogous sensori-motor reflex might be a collision detector circuit linking a bump sensor 
to an emergency stop response. 
At level 1 we have a mid-brain sub-system that responds to simple stimuli emanating from nearby objects or 
sources, that are not themselves harmful, but are commonly associated with danger. These sensor systems are linked 
to motor systems that implement a set of coordinated reflexive responses. For the robot an analogous system might 
be one that used sonar to detect nearby obstacles, formed a thresholded vector sum of repulsive forces, then moved 
in the resultant direction. 
The example robot sub-systems chosen at these first two levels are low-level local navigation competences 
implemented in many of BrooksÕ robots (see e.g. [11] ). 
At level 2 we have a forebrain sub-system that allows arbitrary events to be associated with stimuli that are harmful 
or predictive of harm. These acquired associations provide access to lower level efferent mechanisms producing 
defense reactions. For the robot an analogous system might use reinforcement learning to learn to detect specific 
objects or areas to be avoided. For instance, the robot might learn to detect and avoid situations, for instance 
awkward obstacle configurations, where movement is hazardousÑa learning system that acquires a competence of 
this type is described in [35] . 
At level 3 cortical structures allow relatively complex configurations of stimuli to be recognised. The outputs of this 
sub-system mediate lower level responses.  For the robot an analogous system might learn to recognise a specific 
obstacle configuration as a goal which should be approached. In appropriate circumstances the system would then 
act by inhibiting the avoidance responses generated at lower levels (for a system capable of a similar level of 
competence see [29] ). 
This specific robot design has not been built but clearly could be constructed using existing techniques in situated 
robotics. Were it to be built, its control architecture could be viewed as an abstract, but embodied, model of the 
defense system of the rat. 
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